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Abstract: Modern physics has shown that the universe is fine-tuned for life. 
Theists have argued that fine-tuning of the universe for life can be used as a 
premise in for a teleological argument for the existence of God. One possible 
way to develop such an argument is to argue that the best explanation of fine-
tuning is theistic design hypothesis. There are two strategies which can be em-
ployed against this argument. First one can claim that there are naturalistic ex-
planations of fine-tuning superior to the design hypothesis. In this paper, we 
analyze the two main alternatives of the design hypothesis, the more funda-
mental law, and multiverse hypothesis. The second one can object to the claim 
that the design hypothesis can explain fine-tuning. We also analyze two such 
objections the “God of the gaps” objection and “Who designed the God” ob-
jection. We try to show that both approaches do not undermine the teleologi-
cal argument based on fine-tuning. 
Keywords: Fine-tuning, teleological argument, multiverse, arguments for the-
ism, naturalism. 
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Introduction 
Teleological or design arguments are a form of argument which seeks 
to demonstrate the existence of God qua designer on the basis of some 
particular feature of the universe which seems to exhibit purpose or or-
der. The argument is one of the oldest argument forms for the existence 
of God, and has been defended by thinkers such as Platon, Stoics, Ghaz-
ali, Ibn Rushd, Thomas Aquinas, Newton, Leibnitz; and criticized by 
Lucretius, Hume, Kant, Soren Kierkegaard. This argument was consid-
ered the best argument for God’s existence by Ibn Rushd, who noted it 
as a “Quranic argument” (the arguments from inaya and ikhtira).  
After the criticisms of Hume and Kant, and rise of positivism, the 
teleological argument lost favor. However, in the second half of 20th cen-
tury, with the rise of modern physics and cosmology, the argument made 
a comeback. Physicists recognized that the universe seems to be extreme-
ly fine-tuned for the emergence of life. This gave rise to new forms of 
teleological arguments which, unlike their predecessors, are not based 
upon weak analogical reasoning, but rather are probabilistic, and are for-
mulable in Bayesian or abductive forms. In this paper we will analyse an 
abductive form of teleological argument, based upon examples of fine-
tuning.1 We will first present the case for the fine-tuning of the universe, 
then we formulate the argument and defend it against the alternative 
non-theistic explanations based on multiverse or more fundamental law.  
1. The Fine-Tuning of the Universe for Life 
A universe capable of sustaining life must be able to support beings 
which are able to reproduce and to store and use energy. These are neces-
sary but not sufficient conditions for the emergence of intelligent life. 
Such conditions can only be provided by a universe exhibiting stable en-
ergy sources and a rich chemistry capable of yielding molecular struc-
tures, reproduction and the storage of energy. In the 1970’s and 1980’s - 
                                                          
1  As per the established literature, we will frequently use ‘fine-tuning’ to denote improba-
ble physical phenomena, variation of which would plausibly have precluded the develop-
ment of life in the universe.  We do not presuppose – as the term may suggest – that the 
examples of ‘fine-tuning’ which we describe are in fact literally ‘fine-tuned’ in the sense of 
being purposefully designed, though we do proceed to argue abductively for that very 
claim in turn. 
 
 





















































Criticism of the Non-Theistic Explanations of Fine-Tuning 
after classic papers by Carter (Carter, 1974), Carr and Rees (Carr and 
Rees, 1979), Paul Davies (Davies, 1989) and the extensive study of Barrow 
and Tipler (Barrow and Tipler, 1986) - physicists realized that the set of 
possible laws, constants and initial conditions of the universe conducive 
to the emergence of stable energy sources (stars) as well as chemistry, and 
therefore life, is extremely small. This was termed the ‘fine-tuning’ of the 
universe for life. Since 1970’s the examples of fine-tuning increased exten-
sively2, and physicists and philosophers have sought to account for - or 
questioned whether we need account for – fine-tuning. 
Examples of fine-tuning can be categorised three-fold: 
1. The fine-tuning of the laws of nature. 
2. The fine-tuning of the fundamental physical constants. 
3. The fine-tuning of the initial conditions of the universe. 
In the next subsections we will provide several examples from each 
of these categories.  
a. The fine-tuning of the laws of nature 
The first category of examples of fine-tuning pertains to the laws of 
nature. Were the fundamental laws governing the universe different, life 
would not have developed. To illustrate, let’s take two of the four funda-
mental forces: 
Gravity: Gravity is a long-range attractive force between material ob-
jects. In classical mechanics this law can be expressed mathematically as 
, where  denotes gravitational force,  and denote the 
masses of the objects,  represents the distance between the masses and 
 is a constant known as ‘the universal gravitational constant’. Were 
there no gravity, or were it repulsive or a short-range force - like the 
strong nuclear force - then the formation of stars and planets would have 
been precluded. Stars are formed mostly from Hydrogen and Helium 
atoms, which come together due to gravitational attraction. Without the 
formation of stars, any chemical element more complex than Hydrogen, 
Helium and Lithium would have been impeded – for these heavier ele-
                                                          
2 For technical reviews of the progress in the field, the reader may consult: (Hogan, 2000) 
and (Barnes, 2013). For popular level presentations see: (Rees, 1999) and (Davies, 2007). 
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ments are formed within the core of the stars. But, as noted above, with-
out complex elements and stable energy sources (i.e. stars), life is not 
possible. Thus without gravity, or had it been repulsive or a short-range 
force, then life would not have been possible within our universe.  
Weak Nuclear Force: The Weak Nuclear Force is responsible for the 
radioactive decay of subatomic particles. Thereby it plays crucial role in 
powering stars and creating elements. Were there no such force there 
would not have developed complex elements and stars, and thus no bio-
logical molecules and life. 
The fine-tuning of the laws of nature is not limited to the two fun-
damental forces given above. Two other forces similarly keep the atom 
together. Besides the fundamental forces, other laws of nature play im-
portant role in emergence of life. For example, were electrons bosons 
rather than fermions, then they would condense to the lowest energy 
state and complex chemistry would have been impossible. Or, if sub-
atomic phenomena were governed by classical mechanics rather that the 
quantum mechanics, then there would not have been stable atoms – an 
electron would radiate all its kinetic energy and collide with its nucleus.  
b. The fine-tuning of the fundamental physical constants 
Even assuming our actual laws of nature, such laws do not guarantee 
the emergence of life. Besides the laws, fundamental physical constants 
must also fall within a narrow range of values. For example, had  - the 
gravitational constant - a larger value, masses would have attracted each 
other with a stronger force than is actually the case. Indeed, these con-
stants allow for the emergence of life only in particularly narrow ranges, 
as Stephen Hawking and Leonard Mlodinow put it: 
Most of the fundamental constants in our theories appear fine-tuned in the 
sense that if they were altered by only modest amounts, the universe would 
be qualitatively different, and in many cases unsuitable for the development 
of life… The emergence of the complex structures capable of supporting in-
telligent observers seems to be very fragile. The laws of nature form a system 
that is extremely fine-tuned, and very little in physical law can be altered 
without destroying the possibility of the development of life as we know it. 
Were it not for a series of startling coincidences in the precise details of 
 
 





















































Criticism of the Non-Theistic Explanations of Fine-Tuning 
physical law, it seems, humans and similar life-forms would never have come 
into being. (Hawking and Mlodinow, 2010: 160-161) 
Let us provide two examples of the fine-tuning of the fundamental 
physical constants. One should note that these two examples are just 
representative and do not exhaust all the cases of fine-tuning.  
The strength of gravity ( ): Gravity is  times weaker than the 
strong nuclear force, and thus is extremely weak in comparison to our 
other three fundamental forces. Were the strength of gravity increased 
by  compared to strength of the strong nuclear force3, stars with a 
lifespan of billions of years - like our sun - could not exist.  This would 
have rendered the emergence of life extremely improbable (Collins, 2003: 
189-190). Another example of fine-tuning can be observed by comparing 
its strength relative to the factors determining the expansion rate of the 
big bang, such as the density of mass-energy in the early universe. Had 
the strength of gravity been weaker or stronger by one part in , ceteris 
paribus, the universe would have either exploded too quickly for stars to 
form, or have collapsed to quickly for life to emerge (Davies, 1982: 89). 
The Dimensonality of the universe (D): Our universe has three observa-
ble4 spatial dimensions and one temporal dimension. This is the only 
combination capable of sustaining life. Had there been an additional 
temporal dimension no massive particle would have been stable (Dorling, 
1970), and chemistry would thus have been impossible. Similarly, a differ-
ence in the number of spatial dimensions would have yielded the instabil-
ity of atoms and planets (Ehrenfest, 1917), rendering life impossible.5 
c. The fine-tuning of the initial conditions of the universe 
The fate of the universe is not only determined by the laws of nature 
and the fundamental constants, but is also sensitive to its initial condi-
tions. Initial conditions also appear to be fine-tuned. Here is an example: 
                                                          
3 We assume the strength of the strong nuclear force as the maximum possible value of 
strength of gravity.  
4 There may be unobservably small spatial dimensions as predicted by string theory. But 
presence of unobservable dimensions does not effect our argument, what matter is the 
number of dimensions felt by atoms. And even in string theory that number must be 
three as it is an experimental fact.  
5 For more carefull analysis of fine-tuning of dimensionality of space-time, readers may 
want to consult (Tegmark, 1997).  
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Initial entropy of the universe (S): Entropy is the measure of the order 
in a system.  As a system becomes more disordered we say that entropy 
increases. The Second Law of Thermodynamics states that the entropy of 
the universe will increase with time. The initial entropy of the universe 
was extremely low (Davies, 1984: 168). Had it been otherwise, the amount 
of disorder over billions of years would have prohibited the emergence of 
life. Theoretical physicist Roger Penrose has shown that there were 
different possible initial states of the universe. Since only one of 
these resembles our own universe, the probability of our universe 
amongst them is one over  (Penrose, 1989: 339-345; Penrose, 2004: 
728). This exemplifies incredibly precise fine-tuning - the number of pos-
sible initial states far exceeding the total particle number (baryons, elec-
trons, photons all together) in the entire universe (approximately on the 
order of ). 
Again, this does not exhaust all the possibilities of the fine-tuning of 
initial conditions for life. Other examples such as primordial the ampli-
tude of primordial fluctuations ( ) can be provided (Tegmark and Rees, 
1998).  
2. Fine-Tuning as an Evidence for Theism 
The examples of fine-tuning so outlined prompt the questions of 
whether they require explanation, and of what such an explanation may 
be. If we can show that fine-tuning requires explanation, and that theism 
provides a comparably superior explanation than its alternatives, then we 
will have a strong argument in favor of theism. The argument can be 
summarized thus:  
1. The fine-tuning of the universe requires explanation. 
2. There is a theistic explanation: that God designed the universe 
for the emergence of life. 
3. There is no comparably satisfying non-theistic explanation of 
why universe is fine-tuned.  
4. Therefore, the fine-tuning of the universe provides evidential 
support for theism.  
This is an inference to the best explanation form of argument. We 
 
 





















































Criticism of the Non-Theistic Explanations of Fine-Tuning 
base much of our scientific and the everyday beliefs on this kind of infer-
ence. For instance, although we have never seen electrons, we strongly 
believe that electrons exist because positing them provides the best ex-
planation for many phenomena comparable to explanations which do not 
posit the existence of electrons.  
In this paper we will concentrate on the second and third premise. 
The second premise seems intuitive. According the theistic account, the 
universe is created by an omnipotent and omniscient God with the inten-
tion of creating human beings. Hence, given theism, it is not surprising 
that the universe has all the necessary conditions for life. Moreover, eve-
ryday experience suggests that low probability outcomes frequently sug-
gest some kind of intention. For instance, take a safe which has very 
complicated cipher such that it is very unlikely that the safe can be 
opened by chance. Should one succeed in doing so, the most natural ex-
planation of this observation is that the cipher was entered by a person 
with the intention of opening it. The cipher’s correct entry is seemingly 
non-random event, but rather clearly implies purpose. Similarly, the fine-
tuning of the universe is interpretable as an intentional event indicative 
of a purposeful agent.  
The third premise asserts that alternative non-theistic explanations 
are comparably less compelling than the theistic explanation. In order to 
properly assert this claim we must analyze those alternative explanations. 
Two main alternatives have been proposed: (i) there is some more fun-
damental physical law which explains why the universe is fine-tuned; and 
(ii) the multiverse hypothesis. We will evaluate each of these claims sepa-
rately below, showing that both hypotheses fail to explain the fine-tuning. 
At best, both arguments simply push the fine-tuning up one level - to that 
of the most fundamental law or of the multiverse generating mechanism.  
If all of these three premises are successful, then we have a powerful 
argument for theism. In this paper, we will first concentrate on the third 
premise and analyze the possible non-theistic explanations of fine-tuning. 
We will also evaluate two objections which aim to undermine the second 
premise by arguing that God is not good explanation of fine-tuning, who 
designed the God objection and the God of the gaps objection. 
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3. Objections to third premise 
3.1. The Appeal to a More Fundamental Law 
It may be suggested that although currently we do not have an ex-
planation for the fine-tuning of the universe, we may discover some more 
fundamental law in the future which will entail the current laws and fun-
damental physical constants. Perhaps, for instance, theories such String 
Theory6 or Supersymmetry may solve the fine-tuning problem. Hence, no 
longer would we need be surprised by our universes being fine-tuned.  
This popular response suffers several problems. First, some specula-
tive non-existent law cannot be used as a candidate explanation. The 
person defending this view at least should acknowledge that currently we 
do not have a viable alternative to theistic explanation. Secondly, why not 
assume the opposite: that future physics will show that the universe is 
even more fine-tuned for life? If we take the claim that the universe is 
fine-tuned as a scientific result, as most physicists do, then given that in 
the last 50 years, cases of fine-tuning continuously increased, we should 
conclude that the fine-tuning hypothesis is well-confirmed. Given our 
trust in contemporary science we should expect that the cases of fine-
tuning will increase as our knowledge increases. Thirdly, if we take this 
objection seriously, we should conclude that no inference can be drawn 
from any scientific result given the possibility that in the future this re-
sult may turn out to be incorrect. This reasoning will lead to scientific 
anti-realism.7 But a scientific anti-realist will deny any cases of fine-tuning 
in the first place since it is a claim based on science. Hence more funda-
mental law approach does not seem a promising approach.  
But even granting such a more fundamental law, still it cannot satis-
factorily explain fine-tuning. First the mathematical form of this law will 
be a second-order (if not higher-order) differential equation. As a result, 
it will not be able to specify the initial conditions. Thus, even if we as-
sume that this law explains the fine-tuning of the physical laws and fun-
damental constants, the fine-tuning of the initial conditions will remain 
                                                          
6 Given that currently String theory predicts  different universes, this seems very 
unlikely. 
7  This is hardly surprising, since this objection clearly resembles Lary Landau’s argument 
against scientific realism known as “Pesimistic Meta-Induction” (Laudan, 1981). 
 
 





















































Criticism of the Non-Theistic Explanations of Fine-Tuning 
unexplained. Secondly, such law will not solve the puzzle of fine-tuning, 
since it will shift the fine-tuning explanandum from the laws and funda-
mental constants to the fundamental law itself. The existence of a fun-
damental law which forces the constants of nature to take life permitting 
values is as surprising as the constants being fine-tuned by chance.  
3.2. The Multiverse Hypothesis 
The most popular naturalistic response to the fine-tuning argument 
is the claim that there are many universes, perhaps infinitely many, each 
with different physical laws, initial conditions and constants. Most of 
these universes will not be able to sustain life, but some of them will – 
and we happen to live in such a universe. Proponents of this view claim 
that the multiverse is a sufficient explanation of fine-tuning (Leslie, 1989; 
Smart, 1989; Parfit, 1998). There are several different models of the mul-
tiverse, and those which can be offered to explain fine-tuning can be 
classified three-fold: as a Spatial Multiverse, a Temporal Multiverse, and a 
Metaphysical Multiverse.  
A Spatial Multiverse is the most popularly advocated. In this model 
we have a very large - perhaps infinitely large - single space multiverse, 
subdivided into smaller physical domains (i.e. universes). Each domain has 
different physical laws and constants. The most famous example of this 
kind of multiverse is the Anderi Linde’s chaotic inflation hypothesis 
(Linde, 1994). The main idea of this model is that we have a large eternal-
ly expanding space, within which quantum effects continuously spawn 
new universes, which look like bubbles coming out a bath. String theory 
allows these bubbles to have different laws as well as initial conditions.  A 
Temporal Multiverse is actually a set of universes which exist in different 
temporally successive periods of time.  Such models exhibit a single oscil-
lating universe which expands and then collapses. In each expansion the 
universe may start with different sets of constants and initial conditions. 
The Steinhardt-Turok Ekpyrotic model and Penrose’s conformal cyclic 
model are examples of this type of multiverse. In the Steinhardt-Turok 
Ekpyrotic model (Steinhardt and Turok, 2004), two parallel M-branes 
collide periodically in some higher dimensional space. These collisions 
correspond to a big bang, and the universe initiates expansion. Expansion 
is then reversed by contraction. In this model our universe lies on one of 
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these two branes. As can be seen, this model heavily relies on super-string 
theory and extra dimensionality. Penrose's Conformal cyclic model (Pen-
rose, 2006) is based upon general relativity. In this model black holes are 
treated as entropy eaters. Once all the black holes decay, and all matter 
decays to light, the entropy of the universe is lowered.  All the temporal 
and spatial scales associated with the universe disappear. Once a new big 
bang initiates we pass to the next cycle.  Lastly, a metaphysical type of 
multiverse is a model where all the universes are spatio-temporally sepa-
rated. Whilst both temporal and spatial multiverses involve some kind of 
physical mechanism through which these universes are created, meta-
physical multiverse lack such mechanisms: the existence of these univers-
es is taken as a brute fact. David Lewis’s modal realism (Lewis, 2001) and 
Max Tegmark’s 4th level multiverse (Tegmark, 2005) are examples of this 
type of multiverse. These models predict infinite universes. According to 
Lewisian modal realism, all the possible universes really exist; according 
to Max Tegmark, every mathematically consistent universe exists. Both 
models are similar to each other, in that all the possibilities are accepted 
to be real.  
We should note that although there are many multiverse hypotheses, 
none has widespread acceptance. The standard ΛCDM model does not 
posit a multiverse. It is a popular claim that inflation necessitates a spatial 
kind of multiverse, but this is incorrect: inflation is compatible with ex-
istence of a single universe. That nearly all the multiverse theories which 
imply different constants and laws of physics involve some kind of hypo-
thetical physics is explained by cosmologist George Ellis for the case of 
chaotic inflation: 
In any case, the key physics involved in chaotic inflation (Coleman-de Luc-
cia tunnelling) is extrapolated from known and tested physics to quite dif-
ferent regimes; that extrapolation is unverified and indeed unverifiable. The 
physics is hypothetical rather than tested. We are being told that what we 
have is “known physics → multiverse”. But the real situation is “known phys-
ics → hypothetical physics → multiverse” and the first step involves a major 
extrapolation which may or may not be correct (Ellis, 2008). 
Before examining the claim that the postulation of a multiverse is a 
satisfying explanation of fine-tuning, let us comment on the relation be-
 
 





















































Criticism of the Non-Theistic Explanations of Fine-Tuning 
tween the  theism and multiverse hypotheses. First, theism is completely 
compatible with the multiverse hypothesis. Given that one of the main 
characteristics commonly attributed to God is His being a Grand creator, 
it may not be surprising that He may have chosen to create many uni-
verses. In fact, one of the oldest multiverse theories is due to Muslim 
scholar Fakhr Al-Din Al-Razi, who based his theory upon Quranic argu-
ments (Setia, 2004). Secondly, we should note that multiverse and design 
hypotheses are not necessarily competing. God may have chosen to fine-
tune the constants of nature through some multiverse mechanism; there-
fore the design and multiverse hypothesis are perfectly consistent. Third-
ly, even if the multiverse hypothesis is a satisfying explanation of fine-
tuning, given that the multiverse hypothesis is compatible with theism, 
the theist may further ask which hypothesis better explains fine-tuning. 
On the non-theistic multiverse hypothesis, life emerges in just a few lucky 
universes. On the other hand, God - given his all-goodness - may clearly 
choose to create more life permitting universes than pure chance allows. 
Hence, hospitable universes may be expected to be higher in theistic 
variants of the multiverse hypothesis rather than non-theistic variants. As 
such, fine-tuning appears more likely under a theistic variant of the mul-
tiverse hypothesis than non-theistic variants. Thus, fine-tuning favors the 
theistic multiverse hypothesis over non-theistic variants. 
Nevertheless, it seems that there are several good reasons to suspect 
the explanatory adequacy of the multiverse hypothesis. The first reason is 
that it commits the inverse gambler’s fallacy (Hacking, 1987; White, 
2000).  Suppose that a gambler enters a room and replaces a player in a 
poker hand, having no idea how many hands have been played before. 
When he takes the cards, he observes that he has four aces. Given that 
this outcome is very unlikely he concludes that many hands have been 
played before he entered the room. Is this conclusion valid? Obviously 
not given that each hand is completely independent from the previous 
played hands. This conclusion commits inverse gambler’s fallacy. Many 
philosophers think that multiverse hypothesis similarly commit the in-
verse gambler’s fallacy. Let us take a case of “lucky person” Emre who 
won the lottery 20 times consecutively. Given the odds against the claim 
that Emre won the lottery 20 times consecutively the hypothesis that 
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Emre was cheating becomes considerable option with higher probability 
than pure chance hypothesis. But suppose we also believe that there are 
many Emres playing the lottery in a huge number of different universes.  
Should we believe that, given this information, the outcome is not sur-
prising and that Emre has not cheated?  Given that there is huge number 
of universes, it is not surprising that Emre will win 20 times consecutively 
in some universes? Still, we will not be happy with this explanation for we 
will be skeptical that this universe is the universe in which Emre wins 
without cheating. It seems that the “cheating hypothesis” remains the 
more likely explanation than Emre’s winning the lottery by chance. The 
existence of many other universes does not affect the outcome in this 
universe – a seemingly unlikely event still seems unlikely.  
But even if we assume that explanations based on the multiverse hy-
pothesis do not commit the inverse gambler’s fallacy, it still cannot solve 
the fine-tuning problem for it only pushes the problem one step back to 
what I'll term the 'multiverse generator'. If a naturalistic multiverse ex-
ists, both spatial and temporal universes should be created by some phys-
ical mechanism. This multiverse generator mechanism must itself satisfy 
several conditions such that universes with different constants and initial 
conditions can be formed. Taking chaotic inflation as an example, it must 
satisfy the following conditions, as explained by Robin Colins: 
Consider the inflationary type multiverse generator. In order for it to ex-
plain the fine-tuning of the constants, it must hypothesize one or more 
“mechanisms” or laws that will do the following five things: (i) cause the ex-
pansion of a small region of space into a very large region; (ii) generate the 
very large amount of mass-energy needed for that region to contain matter 
instead of merely empty space; (iii) convert the mass energy of inflated space 
to the sort of mass-energy we find in our universe; and (iv) cause sufficient 
variations among the constants of physics to explain their fine-tuning (Col-
lins, 2009). 
Thus, even if we assume that there is some multiverse generator, 
which creates universes with different constants and initial conditions, 
this multiverse generator must itself be fine-tuned. Since, if any of the 
above mentioned laws governing this universe generator were lacking, it 
would not have been able to produce hospitable universes. Using Colins’ 
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example of a bread making machine, in order to make bread the machine 
must function properly: it must have a suitable electrical system, it must 
produce the right temperature, it must set the correct time, and it re-
quires you to have entered the ingredients of the bread in the right order 
and proportion. Thus, even a bread generator must be well designed, and 
given that the universe generator will be much more complex, surely it 
will require many specific conditions to function adequately.  
There is one important further problem for all varieties of multi-
verse, particularly the infinite ones, which is worth mentioning. Accord-
ing to quantum statistical physics, there is a non-zero probability that a 
fully-formed brain may pop out of vacuum, with false memories and per-
ception. Such brains are called Boltzmann Brains.  It is perfectly possible 
that we are Boltzmann brains rather that normal human beings. Of 
course, the probability of the emergence of such Boltzmann brains is 
extremely low, so if we are leaving in a single universe then we can be 
confident that we are not Boltzmann brains (Page, 2008). But if we are 
living in a multiverse, then since the emergence of Boltzmann brains do 
not require fine-tuning, they will emerge even in universes which are not 
suitable for life. Hence, in a multiverse it is extremely more likely that we 
are hallucinating Boltzmann brains. So, not only do non-theistic multi-
verse proponents have a fine-tuning problem, they also have a Boltzmann 
brain problem.  
4. Objections to the Second Premise 
Some philosophers have denied the claim that theism can explain the 
fine-tuning of the universe. They either claim that theistic explanation of 
the fine-tuning is a form of “God of the gaps argument” or they claim 
that the design hypothesis is not adequate because it does not solve the 
problem of fine-tuning, but merely transfers it to the level of designer 
itself. We now assess these objections.  
4.1. God of the Gaps 
Some philosophers have claimed that the fine-tuning argument is a 
type of “God of the gaps” argument (Stenger, 2004). Since God of the 
gaps arguments are fallacious, the fine-tuning argument  thereby ought to 
be rejected. “God of the gaps” arguments infer God’s existence gratui-
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tously from some natural phenomena which has not been explained by 
science so far. In other words, these arguments are invalid inferences 
based upon gaps in our scientific knowledge. An example of such would 
be: We do not know how lightning is formed; therefore, Zeus makes the 
lightning. Both (almost all) theist and atheist philosophers agree that 
“God of the gaps” arguments are bad arguments and should be rejected. 
However, the fine-tuning argument is not a God of the gaps style ar-
gument. First, the defenders of the argument do not try to fill a gap in 
our scientific knowledge. Quite to the contrary, defenders of the fine-
tuning argument utilize scientific knowledge and emphasize that modern 
physics has revealed the conditions required for life to emerge. The ar-
gument is thus based upon knowledge rather than ignorance. Secondly, 
the common feature of all the “God of the gaps” arguments is that they 
claim that the laws of nature fail to account for some unexplained phe-
nomena. Thus all “God of the gaps” arguments assume that there is some 
domain in nature where laws of nature fail. This is not the case with fine-
tuning argument: it is not based on the claim that there is some domain 
in nature which cannot be described with science.  
One may claim that the fine-tuning argument assumes that science 
will never be able to explain why the constants have the particular value, 
and that this is the 'gap' at issue. But as we saw in the previous section, 
this claim is false: the fine-tuning argument is compatible with some 
more fundamental law - if such exists- which fixes the constants of na-
ture. Since this law just pushes fine-tuning further to the level of the fun-
damental law itself.  
4.2. “Who Designed God?” Objection 
The most popular response to any type of design argument is the 
“Who designed God?” objection popularized by Richard Dawkins: 
The whole argument turns on the familiar question “who made God?” which 
most thinking people discover for themselves. A designer God cannot be 
used to explain organized complexity because any God capable of designing 
anything would have to be complex enough to demand the same kind of ex-
planation in his own right (Dawkins, 2008: 109). 
A similar objection can be found on J.J.C. Smart: 
 
 





















































Criticism of the Non-Theistic Explanations of Fine-Tuning 
If we postulate God in addition to the created universe we increase the 
complexity of our hypothesis. We have all the complexity of the universe it-
self, and we have in addition the at least equal complexity of God. (The de-
signer of an artifact must be at least as complex as the designed artifact) 
(Smart, 1985). 
This objection when applied to the fine-tuning argument claims that 
postulating a designer does not solve the problem of fine-tuning, but 
merely transfers it to the level of designer itself. Given that designer must 
be more complex than the design, it will likewise require a designer. 
Hence the design hypothesis fails.  
This objection is a red herring: the nature of the designer is irrele-
vant for both the premises and the conclusion of the fine-tuning argu-
ment. If upon the discovery of a new disease we find evidence suggestive 
that the best explanation is the existence of a new kind of virus, we 
should conclude that there is such. That we have no information about 
this new virus will not undermine this conclusion. The nature of this new 
virus is wholly different question from the explanation of the disease. 
Similarly, if the universe is fine-tuned, and the best explanation of the 
universe being fine-tuned is that it is designed, then we should conclude 
that there must be a designer. This conclusion is valid independently of 
whether the designer itself needs a designer or otherwise.8  
Moreover, this objection itself is based on a faulty assumption. Why 
should we believe that the designer must be at least as complex as the 
designed artifact? It is perfectly conceivable that even we human beings 
may design complex machines or organisms which are much more com-
plex than us. Besides, the claim seems to be based upon an anthropo-
morphic conception of God. An object or being which is formed with 
intricate parts may be termed a complex being which requires a designer. 
But in traditional theism the designer of the universe is not composed of 
any physical parts, He is timeless and non-spatial. Why assume that such 
a being is complex or requires a designer? The objector must provide 
some good reason to think that God needs to be designed. Without a 
positive reason to suppose that God needs designer, we can Ockhamisti-
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cally conclude that God does not need a designer9. 
Lastly even if we assume that God is more complex than the uni-
verse, we cannot conclude that He must be designed. Indeed, the objec-
tor themselves must hold that a designer being more complex than a 
designed artefact is insufficient for concluding that he must be designed 
too. For the objector will of course agree that, though human beings are 
more complex than their sculptures, it does not follow that human beings 
must be designed.  
Conclusion 
Modern physics has shown that the universe is fine-tuned for life: 
that of all the possible ways physical laws, initial conditions and constants 
of physics could have been configured, only an extremely small range is 
capable of supporting life. It is widely agreed that the universe being so 
fine-tuned for life requires explanation. One possible explanation of fine-
tuning is the theistic design hypothesis. In this paper we analyzed the two 
main alternatives of design hypothesis, more fundamental law and multi-
verse hypothesis. We concluded that both approaches do not succeed in 
explaining the fine-tuning of the universe. We also analyzed two objec-
tions to the claim that theistic design explains fine-tuning, the “God of 
the gaps” objection and “Who designed the God” objection. We tried to 
show that both objections fail to undermine the theistic design hypothe-
sis10.  
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Öz: Çağdaş fizik evrenimizin yaşam için hassas ayarlı olduğunu göstermiştir.  
Bazı teistler evrenin yaşam için hassas ayarının Tanrı’nın varlığı lehindeki bir 
Teleolojik argümana öncül oluşturabileceğini iddia etmişlerdir. Böyle bir argü-
man geliştirmenin bir yolu, teistik tasarım hipotezinin hassas ayarın en iyi 
açıklması olduğunu iddia etmektir. Bu argüman karşısında uygulanabilecek iki 
temel strateji vardır. Birinicisi hassas ayarla ilgili teistik tasarım hipotezinden 
daha güçlü doğalcı açıklamalar olduğunu iddia etmektir. Bu makalede tasarım 
argümanının iki en önemli alternatifi olan daha temel bir yasa ve çok evrenler 
hipotezlerini inceleyeceğiz. İkincisi teistik tasarım hipotezinin hassas ayarı 
açıklayabileceği fikrine itiraz edilebilir. Bu strateji ile yaklaşan iki itiraz “boşluk-
ların Tanrısı” ve “Tanrı’yı kim tasarladı?” da ele alıp değerlendirmeye çalışacağız. 
Makalemizde iki yaklaşımın da hassas ayara dayalı Teleolojik argümanı çürüte-
mediğini göstermeye çalışacağız. 
Anahtar Kelimeler: Hassas ayar, teleolojik kanıt, çok-evrenler, teizm lehindeki 
argümanlar, doğalcılık.  
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